Introduction
Norway has an extensive voluntary sector. Approximately, three-quarters of the adult Norwegian population are members of at least one voluntary organization, and each person is, on average, a member of 2.1 organizations (Arnesen, Sivesind, & Gulbrandsen, 2016) . About 60% have done voluntary work for an organization in the past year (Folkestad, Christensen, Strømsnes, & Selle, 2015) . The environmental movement has, however, never been strong in Norway, regardless of whether this is measured by the number of organizations or the number of organized environmentalists, but it has nevertheless influenced politics due to a close relationship between state and civil society (Grendstad, Selle, Strømsnes, & Bortne, 2006; Strømsnes, Selle, & Grendstad, 2009) .
The issue of climate change has also until recently been poorly represented within the voluntary sector, and relatively few new organizations have been established with this as their primary aim. However, prior to the election for the Norwegian parliament in September 2013, a broad alliance of civil society organizations (CSOs) was established with the purpose of campaigning to mitigate climate change. The alliance, or campaign, was called 'Klimavalg2013 ' (klimavalg2013.no) 1 (directly translated to 'Climate Election 2013') and its main goal was to make the climate issue a central one in the election. Six political demands related to mitigating climate change were defined and communicated to political parties as well as to the general public prior to the election. At the time of the election, 101 organizations had joined the campaign, spanning from environmental and human rights organizations, via churches and religious communities, to trade unions and various associations for sustainable energy solutions. Climate Election 2013 (CE2013) ended with the election in September 2013. 2 In this article, we analyze why these very different CSOs joined the campaign. Our objective is not to measure the actual political effects of the campaign, or assess extent to which the ambition to make the 2013 election about the climate issue was achieved. Rather it is, based on a thorough analysis of types, identity and objectives of the participating organizations, to explore how committed the CSOs that joined CE2013 were and whether the campaign implied an idea of political strength and influence for the organizations on the climate issue. Or was it, on the other hand, something the organizations primarily did to enhance or support their legitimacy, 3 by adding climate concerns to their profile and identity? Environmentalism in general, and the climate issue in particular, is often understood as a valence issue, in contrast to a position issue (Båtstrand, 2015; Carter, 2006; Cox & Béland, 2013; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007) . While position issues are characterized by strong disagreement between those who are in favour and those who are against, valence issues are characterized by agreement on the goals, but often disagreement when it comes to the question of how best to achieve the goals (Stokes, 1992) . Hence, valence issues are broadly understood as issues where agents are largely in agreement and which are therefore considered less consequential with regard to political processes. Our point will be that in this campaign political strength regarding climate issues is understood not in terms of direct influence exerted on concrete, controversial issues. Rather it is understood as the way a large variety of organizations, many of whom have demonstrated no previous involvement with climate questions, now identify with the issue as a valence issue. A dimension of this construction of the idea of political strength is that climate is also envisioned as a matter where organizations might bolster their organizational identity and increase their legitimacy.
We start by presenting a theoretical classification of different types of CSOs, which we later use to categorize the 101 organizations included in CE2013. The approach is described in the method section. The empirical part of the article starts by looking into the political demands of CE2013. Then follows an analysis of the 101 CSOs divided into five groups: environmental, human rights, religious, trade unions and organizations for energy efficiency. The analyses of these five groups are done separately, and then summed up to answer the research questions. The point of this analysis is to explicate the variety of organizations partaking in the campaign, especially how the campaign was joined by a number of organizations with little or no prior demonstrated commitment to the climate issue, and to discuss why these organizations nevertheless decided to join the campaign.
Analytical Perspective on CSOs
The Norwegian voluntary sector is extensive, and the voluntary organizations have traditionally played an important political role as mediating institutions between the citizens and the state. If we look at the environmental field, several nature conservation organizations were established at the turn of the twentieth century, but it was not until the late 1960s or early 1970s that organizations especially concerned with environmental issues were established. The number of members in these organizations has, however, been relatively low, which partly can be explained by the time when the organizations were established. From the late 1960s, the Norwegian organizational landscape changed. The traditional, broad and society-oriented social movements experienced membership decline, while member-oriented special interest and leisure organizations increased their importance (Wollebaek & Selle, 2002) . Many of these new organizations were rather professionalized, the number of members was seen as less important and the role of internal democracy was played down (Strømsnes, 2001) .
The climate change issue came on the political agenda during the last part of the 1980s, following the Brundtland report (The World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987 ), but it is only very recently that the issue has been ranked among the most important questions facing the country (TNS Gallup, 2015) . So far relatively few organizations have been established that focus exclusively on climate change. Instead, the issue has been incorporated in already established organizations within different fields. This makes it highly interesting to see what kind of organizations constitute the CE2013 alliance.
Two dimensions can be used to distinguish between different kinds of CSOs (Wollebaek, 2009; Wollebaek & Selle, 2002; Wollebaek, Selle, & Strømsnes, 2008) . The first dimension is between a conflict-oriented and a consensus-oriented perspective. Within a conflict perspective, democracy is seen as depending on CSOs conveying different interests and thereby securing pluralism and that a spectrum of values and opinions are voiced in society. In this perspective, the political role of CSOs is highly valued. Conflicting interests and values co-exist and are expressed by the organizations, and this is a decisive part of democracy. The consensus perspective is orientated towards local integration and community values, and in this perspective it is rather the social role of the organizations that are valued. Conflicts between interests and values are not welcomed as they are an obstacle to 'doing good' in the local community. It is therefore more the internal democratic role of the organization that is in focus. The organization socializes the members to become good citizens of the society.
The second dimension, cutting across the perspectives of conflict and consensus, is whether the organization primarily works for the benefit of the members or for the society; or in other words whether we talk about 'member-benefit' or 'public-benefit' organizations (Smith, 1993) . Organizations that first and foremost are society-oriented have as their main goal to serve and support the general public more than the members of the organization, while organizations that are member-oriented primarily serve their own members, even though they of course in practice also may have important public functions.
Combining the two dimensions, gives us a classification that allows us to separate between four different types of organizations, as illustrated in Table 1 2009, p. 37). The four types are accompanied by different theoretical perspectives. The first type is service organizations, which are consensus-oriented and primarily work for their members' interests. Within the social capital perspective (Putnam, 1993 (Putnam, , 2000 , which especially highlights this kind of organizations, the organizations are primarily seen as arenas for social interaction and socialization, and as creators of social capital. The second type of organization is conflict-oriented and member-benefit oriented special interest organizations. These are organizations that work politically for their members' interests and are especially valued within the pluralistic theoretical approach to democracy (e.g. Dahl, 1961; Rokkan, 1967) , where CSOs play an important role as intermediary structures between citizens and the state and whose most important role is to communicate the interests of the members to the political decision-makers.
Critical organizations are organizations that are conflict-oriented and work for the interests of the society at large, and are a type of organizations highlighted, for example, within the social movement literature (e.g. Della Porta & Diani, 1998; Skocpol, 2003) . The civil society is within this perspective seen as a political sphere, where different interests and values compete and where critical organizations, whose main function is to try to influence -either change or preserve -the society that surround them, play a decisive role. The final type of CSOs is communitarian organizations, which are consensus-oriented public-benefit organizations. Within the communitarian approach, the main point is to solve local social problems and build good local communities, and the approach therefore values consensus and harmony more than conflict (e.g. Bellah, Madsen, & Sullivan, 1985; Etzioni, 1988) .
A typical characteristic of the Norwegian organizational society has been a high proportion of ideological and society-oriented organizations. Different kinds of 'people's movements' have played an important role both socially and politically as mediating institutions between the local and the state level. The golden age of popular movements lasted from approximately 1880 to 1960, when broad social movements such as the farmers' movement, the temperance movement, the lay Christian movement and the labour movement played an important role as mobilizing agents in the political system. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the number of organizations grew, but now mostly within the culture, sport and recreation field, i.e. more member-benefit and consensus-oriented organizations. In this period, we also see the growth of organizations connected to 'new politics', as for example environmental organizations. The period after 1980 has as well been a development away from social movements and critical organizations and towards more consensus-and member-oriented organizations, in addition to a growth in communitarian organizations. CE2013 is in this respect counter to the general development.
The different perspectives of Table 1 are instrumental in discussing the 101 organizations' values, identity and objectives in relation to the goals of CE2013. CE2013 itself is placed firmly as a critical organization, whereas the following analysis will categorize the 101 organizations according to the typology.
Methodological Approach
The study has been carried out as a document analysis of key documents issued by the 101 CSOs that joined the CE2013 campaign. The documents were primarily collected via the CSOs' own web pages, but to some extent also from mass media, based on the premise that printed as well as computer and internet-based material can be included in document analysis (Bowen, 2009, p. 27; Flick, 2014, pp. 439-450) . The documents were retrieved between August 2014 and December 2015. The point of making documents the study's key material was to access the organizations' self-understanding and presentation, to see whether and how climate concerns were central to their official organizational identity and objectives. It was not to uncover to what degree any self-proclaimed climate objectives were integrated into the operations of the organizations, nor to detect how they impacted policies. To this end, self-authored, official documents are useful, and their value as sources is not reduced by the fact that they might not be accurate renditions of organizational realities and policies.
In addition, expert/elite interviews with the leader of the campaign and one of the key initiators from the religious organizations were conducted in August 2015 and March 2016 (Flick, 2014 . Experts or elites are here defined by their 'ability to exert influence' (Mikecz, 2012, p. 485) , respectively their privileged access to knowledge about processes and their meaning (Littig, 2008) . Following Littig (2008), we do not distinguish between expert and elite interviews here. The interviews were treated as systematizing interviews, contributing to reconstructing knowledge of a particular field, and as background information regarding decision-making and action-processes (Dorussen, Lenz, & Blavoukos, 2005; Littig, 2008) .
Based on the CSOs' main characteristics, we categorize the 101 organizations into five groups. The two biggest groups are environmental organizations and religious organizations. The other groups are humanitarian and animal rights organizations, trade unions and energy efficiency organizations. The classification is based on a bottom-up and reflective approach, where we have grouped together organizations that mainly work within the same organizational field. By recognizing the importance of interpretation (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2005) , the reflective method was utilized to categorize borderline cases such as trade unions for church-related professions, environmental organizations with a special interest in sustainable energy solutions, and some religious organizations concerned with human rights.
After having categorized the organizations, their documents were subjected to content analysis, organized and interpreted according to categories stemming from the research questions and informed by the overall theoretical framework, looking in particular for the organizations' objectives and identity, and their relations to the CE2013 objectives (Bowen, 2009, p. 32) . We were looking in particular for statements on climate change or other environmental matters, and to which extent they corresponded with the demands of CE2013. We were also looking for more implicit characteristics of each organization, to determine whether climate issues were a natural part of the organization's identity and self-understanding. This was especially interesting where the objectives of an organization did not correspond with the demands of CE2013. Figure 1 gives an overview of the methodological approach taken in this research.
The empirical section starts with a short history of the establishment of CE2013, primarily based on CE2013's website as well as information from the chairman of CE2013, before we present and comment upon the six political demands of CE2013.
The Policy Realm and Frame of CE2013
The initiative to establish CE2013 came from a meeting initiated by Grandparents Climate Campaign, to which about 30 organizations were invited. During the meeting, the organizations agreed on a political platform describing the current climate situation, and based on that, CE2013 was established. Thereafter, CE2013 broadly invited organizations to join the alliance, which for the organizations implied that they had to agree on the political platform. After some discussion, the organizations also agreed on six political demands, presented in Table 2 , and all the organizations that joined CE2013 had to sign up to support these as well.
The first demand in Table 2 refers to the gap between reduced emissions in Norway and the UN's recommendations for 2020. CE2013 refers to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) saying that by 2020 rich countries must reduce their emissions by 25-40% compared to 1990, in order to limit global warming to 2°C. However, in Norway, the goal is not set compared to the 1990 level, but to a higher expected business-as-usual level in 2020. This gives a gap of 7-14 million tons of emissions between Norway's goal and the UN's recommendation for 2020.
The second demand of CE2013 refers to climate justice and the historical responsibility of contributions to climate change, which Norway is part of through its high per capita emissions of greenhouse gases. CE2013 explains climate justice as being proactive in The term 'climate justice' must be given a specific content 3
Create green jobs and new industrial development 4
Norwegian oil manufacturing must prepare for reduction in the extraction tempo 5
People must be an important part of the solution 6
A climate policy which takes solidarity between generations seriously international negotiations by cutting emissions inland, and as contributing to reduce poverty both financially and by building renewable energy solutions. The third demand to create green jobs and pursue a new direction for the country's industry refers to how the Norwegian state actively supported the establishment of the petroleum industry in the 1970s, and how the same support must be provided to facilitate green jobs, for example, through tax reduction.
The fourth demand to slow oil production created the most headlines. CE2013 says, in referring to IPCC, that if the global stated objective of stabilizing a rise in temperature to 2°C is to be reached, only one-third of today's already discovered fossil resources can be extracted (International Energy Agency, 2013) . Thus, his quantitative limitation must also apply to the Norwegian petroleum industry.
The fifth demand that people must be part of the solution calls for ways to make it easier for people to reduce their emissions through, for example, better public transportation and support for energy efficiency in housing.
The sixth and last demand says that every level -countries, cities, industry and individuals -must demonstrate that they take solidarity between generations seriously by voluntarily reducing the gap described in demand number 1 above. 4 The prevalent mitigation policy in Norway has to a large extent relied on the price of carbon emissions and trading carbon quotas. Both of these tools rely heavily on the international quota regime as well as the European Union (EU) quota system (Alfsen, Bjørnaes, & Reed, 2011; Moe, 2010) . The political demands of CE2013 are addressing different ways of cutting emissions, primarily domestically, independently of an international climate agreement and independently of the EU quota system. The prospects of these six political demands being fulfilled is that it will require substantial changes in Norwegian politics, society, industry and transportation systems.
For some organizations, the decision to join the CE2013 created challenging discussions both internal and external. The Church of Norway is a leading example here, and its agreement with the six political demands created huge public attention both nationally as well as in local communities. In this respect, membership in CE2013 had a cost side for some of its member organizations, although there was no member fee. The only obligation of being a member of CE2013 was that the organization's name appeared on the list of members of CE2013, which was broadcasted on TV, radio, in newspapers, social media and at seminars and conferences.
CE2013 invited a broad range of organizations to join the alliance. The alliance, via the affiliated organizations, also mobilized about 60 local chapters that participated actively in the 2013 election campaign. The political parties as well as their youth organizations were not invited to join the alliance since the political demands primarily were directed towards the parties, and because CE2013 wanted to appear neutral when it came to party politics. This neutral position was important for the legitimacy of the alliance, according to an interview with the Chairman of CE2013 (19 August 2015). As a part of the campaign, CE2013 (via one of the member organizations) also rated the political parties and gave recommendations regarding which party one should vote for at the election.
The following sections present and analyze the CSOs as belonging to one of five groups; environmental, human and animal rights, religious, trade unions and organizations for energy efficiency. Within the five groups we (1) look at variations in type of organizations based on the CSO typology presented in Table 1 and (2) discuss whether the climate issue is a part of the organizations' objectives and identity.
Environmental Organizations

Type of Organizations
A highly expected group of members of CE2013 are environmental organizations, here defined as having the environment as their primary concern. This group comprises a total of 32 organizations, all in the category of public benefit. We have done a further separation into CSOs having mitigating climate change as their primary objective, listed in Table 3 , and CSOs with a broader environmental objective in Table 4 . Table 3 consists of 12 CSOs established as a direct response to the severity of climate change, and they are all critical organizations, in line with the typology in Table 1 . Several of these, such as Grandparents Climate Campaign, Concerned Artists Norway (CAN), and Concerned Scientists Norway (CSN), are part of international initiatives. The Norwegian Medical Association on Climate and Health consists of individuals and institutions who are encouraged to reduce their personal CO 2 emissions, and to inform and stimulate others -particularly within the health sector -to do the same. They seek to influence politicians to take necessary actions in order to prevent serious health consequences. The Norwegian Writer's Climate Campaign §110 b (later renamed Norwegian Writer's Climate Campaign §112) refers to a specific paragraph in the Norwegian constitution which says, in short, that natural resources must be used in line with the interests of future generations. This paragraph is often referred to as the constitution's environmental law. In their writings, the member authors cast a critical light on the petroleum industry's power in the Norwegian society, including cultural life. The latter is also the mission of the campaign called Stop Oil-subsidizing Norwegian Cultural Life. Table 4 consists of 20 environmental organizations that have a more overall focus on nature and sustainability, and where climate change is one of many environmental concerns. The first column encompasses 12 critical organizations, including several international organizations such as WWF and Greenpeace. Among these 12 critical CSOs is The Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment, a network that consists of 50 Norwegian development, environmental, peace and human rights organizations. Many of these 50 member organizations, for example, Sabima and Oikos, are also Table 4 encompasses eight communitarian organizations. The first six of these are oriented towards local production of food as well as activities that seek to lower our ecological footprint.
5
Objectives and Identity
As we see from Tables 3 and 4 , there are differences in the environmental organizations' primary focus. This difference is also mirrored in whether the demands of CE2013 are part of their objective and identity. The 12 organizations in Table 3 having climate change as an explicit concern were all founded as a result of the climate change issue. Some of the organizations were even established as a direct consequence of the CE2013 initiative (Interview with chairman of CE2013, 19 August 2015). They all have one or several of the same political demands and objectives as CE2013 stated on their web pages. The 12 critical organizations in Table 4 also have policy statements regarding climate change, but these are formulated as part of other environmental issues or as part of concerns for global justice and quality of life. Still the demands of CE2013 contribute to fulfilling the objectives of these 12, although in a more indirect manner than for the ones in Table 3 .
Seven of the communitarian organizations in Table 4 also mention climate change on their web pages, but as an integrated part of their approach to nature. Forum for Nature and Outdoor Activities is a network of CSOs working to put nature's values on the agenda. This network does not mention climate change as an explicit subject, but several of the members in this network, including WWF and Friends of the Earth Norway, do.
Solidarity, Human and Animal Rights
Type of Organizations
In this group, which we have called 'Solidarity, human and animal rights', there are 17 organizations. They work to improve human and animal rights, for a more just distribution of resources between rich and poor, as well as redistribution of power between the sexes. As we see from Table 5 , eleven of these are critical organizations, including the Association for resource-based economy which works for global sustainability and a just distribution of resources. Plan B builds on the book with the same name, written by the president of the Earth Policy Institute (Brown, 2009 ), aiming at an economy built on renewable energy, restoring nature and eradicating poverty. The Rafto Foundation is dedicated to the global promotion of human rights, and a main activity is awarding the annual Rafto Prize for human rights work. Fokus -Forum for Women and Development -is a knowledge and resource centre for international women's issues with an emphasis on women-centred development cooperation. There are six communitarian organizations in this group. HUB Bergen, part of an international HUB Impact Network, operates at the borderline between the idealistic and the commercial and tries to arrange for businesses to become social entrepreneurs and to increase their social impact. Friendship North/South is a community network with an overall goal to engage people from different geographical, political, social, economic and cultural backgrounds in a continuous inter-cultural dialog.
Objectives and Identity
Most of the organizations in Table 5 have the environment high up on their agenda, but not as the main focus, and very few have the political demands of CE2013 as an explicit objective. One exception is Plan B, whose strategy is in line with by and large all the six demands of CE2013 listed in Table 2 . Norway Social Forum (NSF) is part of a broad international movement working for a just world and against the neoliberal economy and politics, which they claim dominate the world today. Substantial parts of Norway's mitigation policy build on a neoclassical economic approach, often referred to as mainstream economics (Nilsen, 2008) , and in this respect NSF's objective fits well with the political demands of CE2013 which can be seen as a criticism of the neoclassical economic platform. For most of the other critical CSOs in Table 5 , concern for the environment is explicitly integrated in their objective towards solidarity, human and animal rights. For instance, the 2012 recipient of the Rafto Prize, Nnimmo Bassey, emphasized the link between human rights and climate change (Rafto Prize, 2012) .
Regarding the communitarian organizations in this group, the demands of CE2013 are more peripheral but still in line with their identity. 4H Norway, a recreation organization especially directed towards children and youth, has as its goal to inspire and educate youth to become active and socially responsible citizens, with respect for nature and humans. The Holistic Society has as one of their objectives to encourage a change of lifestyle 
Religious Organizations
Type of Organizations
Twenty-seven of the CE2013 organizations could be characterized as religious organizations, according to their identity and basis. This is a quite variegated group, comprising religious communities, missionary organizations, diaconal 7 organizations and organizations for specific groups, such as youth organizations. Some of them have climate issues as a particular objective, some do not. But none has climate issues as a primary objective.
As the campaign started in November 2011, there was already an established network for 'Creation and sustainability', a decade-long campaign sponsored by Church of Norway, the Christian Council of Norway, and Norwegian Church Aid. Represented at the initial meeting of CE2013, this network decided that it would be fully in line with their objectives to sponsor the climate campaign. One of their leaders joined the group which drafted the platform and formulated the six political demands and was thus central to the development of the campaign from the start. Personal connections were vital in the subsequent recruiting of especially missionary organizations, which had little or no prior involvement in environmental issues or social ethical issues (Interview with senior adviser in Church of Norway, 03 March 2016). Some religious organizations already associated with the campaign decided to step up their involvement even further, whereas others, such as the Christian Council of Norway, remained associated only through their participation in the ecumenical network.
The religious communities and organizations in CE2013 do not all fall easily into the CSO categories. Religious communities and churches (such as the Catholic Church or Church of Norway) might be grouped as consensus-oriented, member-oriented organizations as well as consensus-oriented, public-benefit organizations. Diaconal organizations obviously work for a common good and public benefit by caring for those in need irrespective of religious affiliation but also often speak up against unjust policies. Thus, they might be grouped as critical as well as communitarian organizations. The same goes increasingly also for some missionary organizations, which seek to promote what to them is an overall good for the entire world, yet at the same time increasingly become involved in human rights struggles, environmental concerns and protection of the creation (Table 6 ).
Identity and Objectives
Christian religious communities seem to have perceived this cause as important based on a wider framework of interpretations of reality, human life and the relation to a transcendent being as communicated in doctrines, confessions, rituals and communal practices.
A basic idea is that the entire reality is created by God, belongs to God and is the object of God's mercy and love. As such it has value in itself, not only in terms of its usefulness for human beings. Human beings are called to responsibility for this created reality, often described by notions such as 'stewardship', 'care' and 'protection of creation'. But how the Christian organizations in CE2013 develop this basic identity into a more explicit engagement with environmental and climate issues varies a great deal.
Some define engagement with climate issues as part of a general responsibility of the church and its individual members, but have otherwise not made environmental or climate engagement an explicit objective of their activities. This goes for about onethird of the religious organizations, for example, the Strømme Foundation or the Stefanus Alliance. However, some of these encourage a change of lifestyle towards simpler ways of living, reduced consumption, etc. This goes for example for the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers). In other words, for these organizations, joining CE2013 is in line with their fundamental identity, but in a quite general sense and not as an explicit objective.
The other two-thirds of the organizations have made engagement with climate and environmental issues a more explicit objective. The justifications for this engagement can be categorized into three main types. The first type starts from the understanding that creation is imbued with certain orders of being. Various life forms, including human life, are interdependent on each other and on the capacities nature has for renewing itself, and human action must accord with and respect this order of being. A second approach points to how actions which exacerbate negative climate effects not only endanger human life for future generations but also have more immediate negative effects. This calls for moral effort to combat and reverse these negative effects. A third approach focuses on climate change as the accumulated effect of unsustainable individual lifestyles rooted in individual attitudes, dispositions and value systems. It calls for a reorientation of individual ways of living, in terms of virtues such as moderation, self-restraint, solidarity and simplicity.
The network of 'Creation and sustainability' has as one of its ambitions to affect political processes but also to build environmental engagement across political divides and parties. Seeking alliances and partners among organizations and agents in political life, civil society and industry and business is underlined, in line with the CE2013 campaign. Yet, the network also stresses that its mandate is to preach the word of God, not dictate political solutions or getting involved in party politics. It therefore created some stir in the network, including the Church of Norway, when the CE2013 campaign assessed the political parties' party programmes and performance on climate and recommended which party to vote for.
Other organizations are less focused on affecting political processes and more focused on their own activities as well as their members' way of living. Leaders for home mission and evangelism organizations within Digni have been very outspoken in their appeals to abandon consumerist ways of life and have ascribed the destructive effects on climate and environment also to individual choices and individual attitudes.
The most widely recognized of the six demands among religious organizations is clearly the one about climate justice. Such organizations underline how the burdens of reversing the negative spiral should primarily be shouldered by nations and communities which benefited from the growth which caused the negative effects in the first place. But also cuts in carbon emissions and solidarity between generations and responsibility for future generations are referred to by many (e.g. Methodist church, Caritas Norge). Some mention increased initiatives to enable consumers to live in a climate-friendly way, but they are fewer than those which advocate changes of individual consumerist lifestyles (e.g. Digni). Slowing down oil and gas production is not mentioned by many. This issue might be perceived as going too far in the direction of advocating politically divisive, concrete solutions. Hardly any religious organization mentions intensifying green businesses and jobs.
Yet, even though several of the organizations are not very concrete or vocal about how to engage politically with climate issues, they seem to have given the six political objectives careful consideration and decided whether or not they could support them (Interview with senior adviser in Church of Norway, 03 March 2016). They might have found in these objectives a concretization elaborated by experts in the field, which they felt they could rely on and support, but not necessarily formulate themselves, and thus might have seen joining the campaign a way of signaling a commitment they could hardly signal on their own.
Trade Unions and Professional Organizations
Type of Organizations
We also find among the 101 CE2013 organizations several trade unions and professional organizations. These are typically conflict-oriented special interest groups which first and foremost work for their members' benefit.
The biggest confederations of trade unions in Norway are the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), the Confederation of Unions for Professionals (UNIO) and the Norwegian Confederation of Vocational Unions (YS). 8 Organizations affiliated with all these confederations are found among the organizations behind CE2013, and most of them are unions organizing public sector employees. Both the dominating organizations within the agricultural sector -the Norwegian Farmers' Union and the Norwegian Farmer and Smallholder Association 9 -joined the alliance, as did several professional organizations within the religious field, including the Norwegian Association of Clergy, which represents 95% of the country's priests, the Norwegian Association of Deacons and the Church's Association for Education. In addition, two small, independent trade unions within the cultural field joined CE2013: The Norwegian Actors' Equity Associations is an organization with about 1250 members and which purpose is to protect the artistic, legal and financial interests of actors in Norway, and the Norwegian Dancing Artists is an organization for dancers, choreographers and teachers, with about 870 members. Lastly, we find within this group of organizations two organizations for the geophysical milieu in Norway: the national organization Norwegian Geophysical Society and the local organization Bergen Geophysical Society. Both organizations are interest groups for researchers in geophysics and are, alongside the trade unions, classified as special interest organizations (Table 7) .
Objectives and Identity
The most common argument for joining the campaign found among unions, business and professional organizations is the challenge related to creating green jobs and new industrial development. This is an argument we find for example within the Norwegian Union of Municipal and General Employees and the Norwegian Civil Service Union. Furthermore, the Norwegian Farmers' Union and the Norwegian Farmer and Smallholder Association argue that more food should be produced locally in order to reduce our ecological footprint, and the Norwegian Association of Clergy has sustainable stewardship as one of its main objectives, as well as highlighting the importance of climate justice and solidarity between generations. Among the three church-related trade unions, the Association of Clergy is the one with the most clearly pronounced climate policy. The Norwegian Association of Deacons and the Church's Association for Education also mention the climate issue on their websites, but it is not stated as a part of their objectives. For these organizations, the engagement seems to follow from the general climate engagement within the Christian Church, demonstrated through projects such as The Green Church and the Christian Network of Environment and Justice. On the two geophysical societies' web pages, the climate issue and the demands of CE2013 are not very visible. As organizations representing professionals within disciplines like meteorology, oceanography, hydrology, earth physics, ionosphere physics and volcanology, they have, however, a natural concern for climate changes, which is reflected in their engagement in CE2013.
It is more difficult to see why organizations like the Norwegian Actors' Equity Association and Norwegian Dancing Artists decided to join CE2013, and very little is found about the climate issue on these organizations' home pages. Both organizations joined the alliance after a request from members of the organizations, and they justify their engagement by arguing that it is important for artists to be informed and updated when it comes to such big and difficult challenges as the climate issue (Norsk skuespillerforbund, 2013; Norske dansekunstnere, 2013). This justification resembles the ethics of virtue, in the sense of contributing to wisdom, character and the good life.
Engagement in the climate issue has for a long time been a discussion within several of the confederations. When the leader of the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) together with the leader of the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) argued in a chronicle that the climate mitigation efforts ought to be 'cost-effective', implying that most mitigations must be done in countries with lower costs than Norway (Kristiansen & Lund, 2014), it raised debate within a number of unions. By contrast, the Norwegian Union of Municipal and General Employees and the Norwegian Civil Service Union were much more impatient, wanting a more radical approach than the LO confederation's stepwise climate strategy (Fri Fagbevegelse, 2014) .
While 15 trade unions and professional organizations joined CE2013, it should be noticed that there also were unions that chose not to become a part of the alliance. One example is the Norwegian Society of Graduate Technical and Scientific Professionals (Tekna), which represents professionals holding a Master's degree in science or technology disciplines. The organization was a part of the group that first met to initiate CE2013, but decided not to join as they could not commit to the six political demands. Especially, the claim that Norwegian oil manufacturing must prepare for reduction in the extraction tempo was demanding since the organization has a lot of members working within the oil and gas industry (Teknisk Ukeblad, 2013; Interview with chairman of CE2013, 19 August 2015 .
All in all, we can conclude that most of the organizations within this group have one or several of CE2013's demands as part of their objectives, and most often the demand to create green jobs and new industrial development. For the two geophysical societies it is not stated as a part of their objectives but is nevertheless a part of their identities. For the Norwegian Actors' Equity Association and Norwegian Dancing Artists the justification for their engagement is more a need to be informed than an engagement for the climate issue per se.
Organizations for Sustainable Energy and Transportation Solutions
Type of Organizations
The last group of organizations consists of advocacy groups involved with energy efficiency improvement and sustainable solutions within the energy and transportation sector. Nine of the organizations can be classified within this category, covering a spectrum of different organizations arguing for varied forms of alternative energy sources and transportation systems. In Table 8 , we have differentiated between the 'alternative energy' and 'alternative transportation' organizations.
Three of the organizations are primarily concerned with alternative and sustainable transportation solutions: Electric Vehicle Union (EVU), which aim is to promote the use of electric vehicles, For Railway, which is a membership organization promoting a more comprehensive use of railways for domestic transportation and transportation between Norway and other countries, and the Norwegian Cyclist Association which has as its goal that more people should look at the bicycle as the solution to their everyday transportation needs. Especially EVU and the Norwegian Cyclist Association, but also For Railway, are member-oriented. They propose solutions involving not only individual responsibility-taking but also political changes. Accordingly, they are classified as special interest organizations.
Among the alternative energy organizations, we find organizations arguing in general for the transition to sustainable energy systems, energy efficiency and renewable energy and organizations promoting specific energy solutions, as bio-and solar energy, hydrogen-based energy, wind power, long-distance heating and water-borne heat. Also when it comes to type of organization, we find great variation, and for some of the organizations it is even doubtful whether they should be counted as voluntary organizations at all. For example, the Inland Norway Energy Agency is a regional knowledge centre for energy efficiency and renewable energy, owned by two county municipalities and one energy supplier (here classified as a communitarian organization), and Light Efficient AS is a company delivering energy-efficient light solutions for the industry and retail market (not classified). The Norwegian District Heating Association is a special interest organization for the long-distance heating branch. An important objective for the remaining organizations within this category, classified as communitarian organizations, is to spread information and knowledge about alternative energy solutions.
Objectives and Identity
It is not difficult to understand why advocacy groups working for sustainable energy solutions and transportation systems engage in CE2013. The main goal of the organizations is to find alternative, renewable solutions to the challenges created by today's fossil fuel sources. The organizations will then especially be committed to CE2013's demands to 
The 101st Organization
Lastly, after having categorized 100 of the organizations in CE2013, there is one organization left and which is difficult to place within any of the five categories. This is the National Association of Folk Academies, which has as its goal to increase peoples' quality of life through participation in cultural activities. The organization arranges yearly more than 3000 different cultural events (song, music, theatre, literature, entertainment, speeches, debates etc.), and can be classified as a communitarian organization. The climate issue is not a pronounced part of the organization's objective or identity.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our analysis of the CE2013 campaign and its participating organizations has shown that the types of organizations supporting CE2013 varied substantially, covering the whole spectrum of the typology used in this analysis as shown in Table 9 . The largest group was the critical organizations, which see civil society as a political field and try to influence the society that surrounds them. The second largest group was communitarian organizations, i.e. consensus-oriented, public-benefit organizations, including religious groups, environmental groups, humanitarian groups and organizations promoting sustainable energy solutions. Nineteen of the organizations were special interest organizations, consisting mostly of trade unions and professional organizations, with service organizations found only within the religious field. Not more than 12 of the 101 organizations in CE2013 were primarily concerned with the climate issue, and several of these were formed as a part of establishing the CE2013 campaign. For the other organizations, the climate issue was only a part, and sometimes a rather peripheral part of what they were doing. Very few of the organizations based their involvement in CE2013 on the whole package of political demands promoted by CE2013. The organizations primarily voiced more general support of and concern for the climate agenda, rather than advocating very specific positions. To the extent that they did advocate more particular standpoints, they tend to 'pick and choose' from the list of the six political demands, and they did so in rather different ways. For some of the organizations the climate engagement was more a question about individual responsibility-taking, reduced consumption and reorientation of individual ways of living than a question of fundamental political changes. There were also several examples, especially within the religious field, of organizations that clearly resisted becoming 'too political' and avoided an outspoken political standpoint. Hence, for some of the organizations this was clearly more about giving support to a cause than to advocate for fundamental political change, i.e. more a question of legitimizing support than political strength.
As mentioned initially, the point of this analysis was to explicate the variety of organizations partaking in the campaign, and understand this as a way of pursuing political strength and influence with regard to the climate agenda. In this concluding discussion, we will argue that the notion of 'valence' might help understand the dynamics of this campaign and to explicate more general theoretical insights from the empirical analysis.
First, descriptively, the notion of 'valence' captures well the nature of the climate issue as it is pursued by the CE2013 campaign. For most of the organizations that joined CE2013, the climate issue was not what they primarily were engaged in. However, as long as CE2013's demands were not in opposition to the organizations' primary objectives, it was for most organizations easy to support the cause. By joining the campaign, they strengthened their legitimacy by being associated with the climate issue as a valence issue, but often with rather weak commitments.
Drawing further on theory about valence issues also helps articulate two more general, theoretical insights from this empirical analysis. First, in their analysis of the notion of 'valence', Cox and Béland (2013) argue that valence is a quality of policy issues and ideas by which they attain attractiveness or appeal. It is therefore a quality of a political idea by which it comes to hold power or strength. And it does so by connecting a political idea positively or negatively with certain moods or emotions (Cox & Béland, 2013, p. 313) . It is a way of describing how people or groups come to hold the -often pre-reflectiveconcerns and preferences which then guide them in preferring certain policy options over others. In other words, the notion of valence might help understand how groups might gather together across an apparently broad and variegated spectrum of objectives and positions: because they are responding to an appeal to a more basic concern or preference of theirs. This corresponds with the point that valence of policy issues are typically associated with higher level of abstraction, stemming 'from abstract normative issues' (Cox & Béland, 2013, p. 316) . In other words, the more general insight to be derived from this analysis is how the dynamics of this form of broad CSO campaigns is better understood as gathering support of a strong, normative concern with broad appeal, rather than engagement with specific political goals and decisions.
The second theoretical insight to be derived from combining the analysis above with the theoretical notion of valence is how this quality of appeal of a political idea also provides those who invoke it with authority (Cox & Béland, 2013, p. 308) . Advocating and being associated with a policy issue with high valence will also, by virtue of the general appeal and attractiveness of the issue, confer legitimacy and credibility. Thus, gathering around a policy issue with high valence could therefore also be interpreted as a way of effectively seeking political strength and power, and thus help explain why a highly variegated group of organizations, many of whom had no prior explicit commitment to the climate issue, came together in the CE2013 campaign.
In sum, we argue that this campaign exemplifies one way CSOs might pursue political strength: less in terms of fighting for specific political positions and decisions and trying to rationally convince others about their superiority, and more in terms of exploiting the appeal and attractiveness of more basic political concerns and ideas and the authority and credibility it incurs on those invoking them. A topic for future studies is to analyze to what degree associating with issues based on their valence may turn out to have negative consequences for the organizations as well. An interesting case to study further would in this respect be the transfer from CE2013 to the new Climate Election Alliance, which only includes about 60 of the original organizations. What organizations decided not to be a part of the new alliance, and why? Another topic for future studies would be to look at the consequences for a political campaign when several of the organizations involved have low commitment to the cause. Is it only the logic of numbers that are important for a political campaign to succeed, or is there a logic of commitment involved as well? Notes 1. The alliance's web page was recently replaced by a new web page, klimavalgalliansen.no. At our request, the list of the member organizations in Klimavalg2013 is now available at klimavalgalliansen.no/?page_id=38. 2. In 2014, a more permanent alliance called 'Klimavalgalliansen' ('The climate election alliance') replaced CE2013. The political demands are by and large the same, but only about 60 of the organizations remain in the new climate election alliance three and a half years after the 2013-election (see klimavalgalliansen.no). This article does not cover the transfer to 'Klimavalgalliansen'. 3. Legitimacy is defined by Suchman (1995) as a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs or definitions. 4. The demands and the explanations are stated at http://www.klimavalgalliansen.no/?page_id= 36 except the sixth demand of CE2013 which in Klimavalgalliansen is replaced by 'Invest in climate solutions'. 5. There is a lot more to be said about the different environmental approaches and concepts mentioned in this paragraph, and how this relates to not only identity, but world view and values. The differences between focusing primarily on climate change, having a broader or holistic environmental focus, and the concept of ecological footprint require more space than what is possible in this paper. 6. The 4 H's stand for Heads, Hearts, Hands, Health. 7. 'Diaconal' refers to churches' activities of care for people in need, such as social work, health care, etc. 8. The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) has 24 national unions affiliated, covering approximately 900,000 members (LO, 2016); The Confederation of Unions for Professionals has 12 affiliated unions and approximately 340,000 members (UNIO, 2016); and the Norwegian Confederation of Vocational Unions (YS) cover 18 different trade unions with a total of 220,000 members (YS, 2015) . 9. The Norwegian Farmers' Union has more than 60,000 members, 540 local branches and 18 regional associations, and The Norwegian Farmer and Smallholder Association has about 7000 members, organized in 18 regional associations.
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